Abstract

This study aims to analyze and examine the truth and reasoning behind Turkey’s active role in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts specifically, and in the Middle Eastern region in general. The study relies on the systems analysis approach and uses it to explain Turkey’s logic and inspect all their decisions regarding those conflicts, in an attempt to assess the risks and threats posed by Turkish policies and their impact on the future of the political settlement of these crises. The study found key results, which are: that Turkey’s role is a negative factor in resolving the Syrian and Libyan crises, due to it being malicious in nature and only wanting to further Turkey’s regional role. The study also found that the Turkish role directly affects the aggravation of both the Syrian and Libyan crises. As well as
hindering or completely stopping any efforts to resolve both the Syrian and Libyan crises.

The study decided on a few recommendations/ a course of action in order to ensure an optimal resolution to these conflicts which consists of creating concerted efforts and synergy between Arab countries, coordinating and activating Arab integration and agreements in several political, economic, and military fields to reduce the imbalance of powers with Turkey and other regional actors, and confront any type of unwanted interference in Arab affairs and protect national security. Developing a strategy with the goal of countering and intercepting the repercussions of Turkey’s actions. Reviving the joint Arab Defense agreement through the League of Arab States is also another way to create a force capable of protecting Syria and Libya from the threats of Turkey’s policies. As well as preventing similar issues from happening in the future. Many academic studies and research have focused on studying the nature/objectives of the Turkish intervention In the region, a consensus has emerged about the risks posed by Turkish policies towards dealing with the crises of the region, especially the Syrian and Libyan crises, where the research paper aims to try to find an explanation and academic analysis to assess the impact of Turkish policies on the future of the political settlement of these crises and the extent of the impact of those policies on the chances of success of the
international/regional political tracks presented to assess the Turkish role more accurately and determine the size of the risks posed by those Policies on Arab and Egyptian interests and finding suggestions and recommendations to confront them.

**Keywords:** Turkey, Syria, Libya, Conflict, International Relations, Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Relations, Crisis, Regional, Threats. Conflict Resolution, Repercussions, Invasion.

Turkey is one of the most prominent regional actors in its regional environment, in connection with its cultural heritage related to the period of rule of the Ottoman Empire, and its possession of many influential [political-economic-military] tools on which Turkish policies are based to achieve its interests and objectives in its areas of interest, and Turkey’s growing interest has emerged In the Middle East under the rule of the Justice and Development Party [in power since 2002], especially after the Arab Spring revolutions, which began in 2011, where it contributed in bringing about a fundamental change in Turkish policies and shifting from the theory of "Zero problems with neighboring countries" and relying on soft power tools to achieve its goals to rely on hard power tools to impose its policies and achieve its expansionist ambitions by exploiting the geostrategic vacuum resulting from the security deterioration in many
countries in the region with the aim of restoring the glories of the Ottoman Empire.

Successive international changes since the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century have led to a decline in the role of Arab regional powers in leading the regional system, especially after the Arab revolutions and their negative repercussions that included all fields (political - economic - military / security - social). The emergence of transformations that reflect the superiority of other non-Arab regional powers, and the growing influence of those forces on the Middle East region.

The region is going through an exceptional situation during which the regional security system is restructured with its various dimensions and the equations of regional relations of countries with each other, and between them and other countries within their regional scope. As well as the matrix of centers of gravity in the regional balance equation as a result of the policies and strategies of the non-Arab active regional powers to achieve their goals and plans in the region through their orientations and policies affecting the Middle East region.

The description of overlapping regional issues and interests is related to the need to reach the form of potential security arrangements, whether what is between the countries of the region or what is regional, which reflects the regional interests and strategies either towards the countries of the region in
general or towards specific countries and regions in particular, in addition to the necessity of identifying the strategies and directions of regional powers such as Turkey and their direct repercussions or indirectly on the Middle East and thus Arab national security.

Turkey enjoys a strategic location that qualifies it and forces it to pay attention to regional considerations, and keeps it away from any form of security threat to its lands on the one hand, and brings it many economic benefits, whether within the framework of its trade relations, or through the transit of energy resources through its lands on the other hand, and gives it its position This is a broader field of movement and the search for regional and international influence on the third hand. The emergence of the Turkish role and interest in it has increased in most of the pivotal issues in the Middle East, especially in light of the Turkish policy towards the region, which is based on confirming Turkey’s presence and position as a central force in various issues and conflicts in the region.

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish foreign policy has directed towards the West or "Westernization under the name of modernization", and has turned its back on the East, especially the Arab world. This alienation was evident from its participation in the Korean War in 1950, along with the United States of America, its accession to NATO membership in 1952, and allowing
American forces to use a base The Turkish Incirlik in 1958, during the Lebanese crisis, and the vote for France in the United Nations, during the war of independence in Algeria, and finally, the signing of the Ankara Agreement between the European Community and Turkey in 1963, which stipulates the possibility of accession Turkey in the future to the European Union, which continued its relentless pursuit, within the framework of its long-term strategy, to secure its membership in the European Union. Over the course of decades, the relationship with the United States of America remained the center of its political interests, membership in NATO was the basis of its military and strategic interests, and the file of its accession to the European Union was the core of its economic interests. (Al-Jamil 1997) (Larrabee 2003) (Aydin 2004)

The Cold War period contributed to clarifying the priorities and directions of foreign policy clearly, when Turkey clashed with the issues of the region, and this was not in the interest of the Arab countries. The Ocean Belt Agreement of 1958, and it cooperated with it, intelligence and militarily, for many years, as well as its role in the first and second Gulf wars in general.

Since the end of the Cold War, which began with the collapse of the eastern camp, Turkey has sought to find an effective regional role in the region, especially after the Justice and Development Party came to power
and assumed power in 2002. This was followed by a radical change in Tactical directions and the origins of the policies followed. Turkey began to reinterpret and formulate its foreign policies, by redefining its capabilities, orientations, and aspirations.

This change came as a reflection of the interdependence and interaction between internal and external variables, which led to the playing of an external political role for Turkey under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his sweeping of the Turkish internal arena, and allowed him to form the government to clarify the parameters of a new foreign policy for Turkey, which came after the discovery of the area of strong influence that is not It is the Middle East region. This was reflected in the Turkish foreign policy, which adopted a moderate approach that combines a strong Islamic current and a secular regime in a rare experience, to form “a model that draws attention as it balances the requirements of the West, which supports civil life and does not restrict it, And an Islamic system, and the principles of a new political Islam, to be in the end acceptable by all parties. (Aydin 2004) (Ozkan 2013)

Since that time, the AKP's policies have depended on three factors. The first is Turkey's reconciliation with its civilizational and Islamic self, and pride in its multicultural and multi-ethnic Ottoman history and past. While the second factor emphasized restoring and restoring a sense of Ottoman
grandeur, self-confidence, and getting rid of the feeling of weakness in the field of foreign policy, the third and final factor required the continuity of orientation towards the West, parallel to relations with the Islamic East, which prompted some to call the trend "neo-Ottomanism". (Al-Jamil 1997)

Ahmet Davutoğlu, an academic researcher, became the prime minister’s chief foreign policy advisor, after winning the elections in 2002, and Ali Davutoğlu was called the architect of Turkish foreign policy, and the theoretical framework for AKP policy, through his pioneering work.

Strategic depth: Turkey's position and role in the international arena. The main objective of Turkish foreign policy has become to rediscover the Middle East, which constitutes a strategic depth for it, in addition to eliminating problems with neighboring countries while relying on soft power. And Oğlu laid the theoretical foundations that Turkey (Justice and Development) followed.

Since the beginning of the events, the Justice and Development Party has considered the events as a protest for Muslims in the region against authoritarian governments, compared to the Turkish case of the Justice and Development Party against the secular establishment. From this perspective, and according to the vision and perception of the AKP elites that Turkey is the leader of the democratic transition in the Middle East,
the events that the region witnessed is a revolution against the semi-
Kemalist/secular regimes in the Middle East. This was an external factor as
an independent variable that is seen through the lens of local factors, i.e.
the Islamic reference of the Justice and Development Party, which affects
the dynamics of the successive developments in the region, all from an
Islamic ideological perspective that aims to support the rise and stability of
Islamic regimes under the leadership of The Turkish model, under the neo-
Ottoman umbrella. Indeed, these revolutions constituted a test and
challenge to the premises and theories of Turkish foreign policy, which the
Justice and Development Party has adopted, since its rise to power in 2002,
especially the case of the popular movement on January 25 in Egypt, and
the subsequent arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, then the
outbreak of the June 30, 2013 revolution, and what followed all these great
events of severe divergence in Turkish foreign policy towards Egypt - and
in this context This chapter will be dealt with in two sections, in addition to
the summary.

The first section: the foundations and fundamentals of Turkish foreign
policy.

The second section: Turkish trends and goals in light of the neo-Ottoman
concept and Turkey's position towards these crises. (Al-Jamil 1997)
The wave of revolutions that the Arab countries have witnessed since the beginning of 2011 raises many questions on the future of the Middle East region and the roles of the actors in it, and in this context, the Turkish role is increasing in dealing with these changes and their expected effects, as the years after 2011 witnessed an increase in Turkish interest in the issues of the Middle East, As the region has an interest in the new open Turkish policies based on a religious background based on a common historical and civilizational basis between Arabs and Turks, especially during the Ottoman era.

When talking about a Turkish role with a methodological and intellectual rooting for the Turkish decision-maker, we find that the main objective of Turkish policy in the region is to confirm that Turkey is a central and active country on the international and regional arena, passing through its role in the neighboring regions, especially the Middle East, by adopting the role of a buffer state Which is embodied through two complementary paths, namely the path of middle power, which is mainly represented in leadership, and the path of the supporting force represented in mediation. Economic and strategic area. (Al-Jamil 1997) (Tocci 2013)

**The pillars on which Turkish foreign policy is built:**

Turkey's pride in its history, civilization, and its Ottoman past with different cultures.
Turkey’s sense of greatness and self-confidence and getting rid of its feeling of weakness in the field of foreign policy, with the continuity of orientation towards the West at the same time, the formation of relations with the Islamic East, the development of the diplomatic method and the reformulation of its role in the international arena with the adoption of a multi-directional foreign policy that strengthens its position as a regional and international actor, within the framework of Smart recruitment of the elements of Turkish power internally and externally.

American support for Turkey through the strategic advantage provided by its distinguished geographical location and the presence of the NATO air base, the “Incirlik” base, which provided air cover for the coalition forces in the 1990s to strike Iraqi targets and monitor the no-fly zone which was imposed on Iraq after the events of the occupation of Kuwait in 1990 AD and its repercussions on the security of the area.

Ankara’s mission is no longer to establish diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and geographical neighborhoods within an integrated scope, but its first task has become to change the ruling regimes and penetrate the peoples culturally in order to enhance its re-positioning and spread on a larger scale

**Turkish strategy towards the Middle East:**
At the outset it is possible to distinguish between two main stages in Turkish policy towards the Middle East, the first stage from 2002 until 2010, where the Justice and Development Party government sought to implement a "zero problems" policy to contain all its problems with neighboring countries, and also sought to shake up its historical problems with The Armenians and the Kurds, and Turkish policy during this stage was able to utilize its soft power, by promoting Turkish drama, providing aid across the Islamic world, and employing the Palestinian cause. (Hinnebusch 2015) (Ozkan 2013)

The second phase started from 2011 until now, as Turkey began to intervene directly in the Middle East issues to become a major player in them, in a way that exacerbated its regional crises with many countries in the region. Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East is ambivalent, as it depends on a number of points that support it in building a vital geographical dialogue to grow its influence and enhance its interests they are as follows:

Following promotional “pragmatism” in paying attention to Arab issues and crises, foremost of which is the refugee and immigrant crisis, which is trying to take advantage of it to show itself as the regional forces supporting Arab issues, on the other hand, using it as a pressure card on European countries to grant them more facilities to join the European
Union, considering them Protecting the continent from the influx of refugees and migrants.

Strengthening the opposition factions and armed militias in the areas of conflict, which represented another turning point in the determinants of foreign policy. Ankara used to support political Islam currents to gain power in the Arab countries, presenting itself as a model that was able to integrate Islamists into the government, but in fact it is a model that was able to exploit Political Islam movements in the region to serve as a gateway for interference in the internal affairs of many Arab countries. (Hinnebusch 2015) (Tocci 2013) (Ozkan 2013)

Activating the Turkish role as an alternative ally in the crises in the region, which is inversely proportional to the Turkish role, which embodied itself as playing a mediating role in resolving conflicts to create legitimacy for it to intervene in regional crises. Maximizing the use of Turkish soft power as an external tool that can influence other countries in addition to influencing the peoples of the region, which carries with it the promotion of the Turkish model based on democracy, which was able to achieve economic success based on the free market.

**Motives of Turkish trends in the Middle East:**

The eastern Mediterranean is highly coveted for its huge reserves of natural gas, so Ankara wants to have an abundant share of these wealth. The
“Eastern Mediterranean” agreement, known as “East MED” between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, aims to secure energy supplies. In Europe, to impede Turkey’s attempts to expand its control over the eastern Mediterranean, and it can be said that the Turkish-Libyan alliance came in response to that agreement, and through that, it can be said that Turkey’s motives in the Middle East are summarized as follows:

1. Turkey is the only country that connects the two continents of Asia and Europe, and straddles four seas in the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, and the Marmara Sea, which connects the Black Sea to the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Regionalism in its immediate surroundings, which made Turkey the greatest common denominator in the strategic calculations of the great and major powers that have arisen throughout its history, especially those related to balances, counterbalances, or alliances and counter alliances. (Khalifa 2017)

2. Turkey sees its military presence in the Middle East, especially in the Arab countries, whether in the form of agreed-upon military bases or the presence of military forces on these lands, such as Syria, Iraq and Libya, to ensure access to regional markets as an alternative to European markets after its bad relationship with the European Union countries, as Turkey sees in The neighboring Arab
markets are a starting point for promising markets in the future. (Khalifa 2017)

3. The desire to participate in the international coalition to combat terrorism, not only because of its desire to confront terrorism on its borders, but the real goal of it is to stop the expansion of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and Syria for fear of its independence.

4. The Arab countries are the best supplier of energy sources to Turkey, whether because of their large reserves, or because of their proximity to them, whether the Gulf states, or both Libya and Algeria, and it enables them to secure a major energy resource for Turkey, in light of its current attempt to search for gas in the eastern Mediterranean in front of The coast of Cyprus, which the European Union countries oppose, and the Arab countries are also among the most important suppliers of tourism to Turkish lands, as it is estimated that it has shrunk during the recent period due to the poor relations between Turkey and many Arab countries at the present time. (Cevik 2019)

5. The competition between the main regional states, Iran, Turkey, and Israel, and the economic cooperation or the state of normalization between the Arab states with Israel made the Middle East a market
that was divided against these regional states in addition to the traditional competition between the major states as well.

**Turkish trends in the Middle East:**

Turkish trends depend on active tools in their foreign relations that combine soft power and hard power. From the researcher’s point of view, three different factors are at play.

**a. The political factors of Turkish trends in the Middle East:**

Turkey aspires to an influential regional role that can be employed in its relations with the United States of America and the European Union. Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the region while realizing the importance of having coverage from international actors, especially the United States of America.

Turkish foreign policy and the growing Turkish trade relations with the region had little effect in Tunisia and Egypt, but Turkey, which was a non-major power before the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring, emerged as a major party during and after the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and then engaged with great enthusiasm in Syria. (Cevik 2019) (Tocci 2013)

These events provided a space for Turkey’s activity to present its role as a third party and mediator.
In addressing the internal Arab disputes and trying to limit their regional extensions and international interference in them, with the Turkish focus on political and diplomatic approaches mainly, whether in the form of political pressure to varying degrees on governments or by hosting conferences for some opposition forces, as in the case of Syria and Libya, with proposing initiatives that balance considerations of freedom and maintaining security and stability.

It also revealed the truth of Turkish politics and its hidden regional aspirations in an effort to replicate the Ottoman Empire again.

b. **The economic factors of Turkish trends in the Middle East:**

The economic goals and interests come at the top of the Turkish leadership’s priorities

Towards the east came in response to the internal transformations and the transformation in the surrounding environment.

Turkey's attitudes towards the so-called Arab Spring affected its economic interests in the region that has witnessed important developments due to the effectiveness of Turkey's research strategy for new markets and prosperity policy of making exports a substitute for any ideological plans.

Turkey aspires to play a pivotal role in the field of energy at the level of the countries of the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia.
Turkey is currently suffering from economic losses in its relations with European and regional countries. With the expected escalation of losses after the deterioration of the situation and interference in the Syrian and Libyan affairs. (COAR 2020) (Khalifa 2017) (Ozkan 2013)

c. **The military/security factors of Turkey’s trends in the Middle East:**

Turkey possesses a huge military power, which made the Turkish army work on developing a defensive strategy based on turning Turkey into an influential element of strength and balance in the region, taking advantage of opportunities to achieve cooperation and develop relations with the countries of the region.

Turkey's desire to impose its presence in the region within the framework of the Middle Eastern security arrangements in a way that guarantees it a prominent role.

Turkey's strategic attachment to the West through its membership in NATO gives it the strength to achieve its regional ambitions and legitimate interests.

Turkey seeks to maintain the strategic balance in its favor on the basis of overall superiority over its neighbors. (Ozkan 2013) (Tür 2016)

The relationship with Tehran was damaged by Ankara's deployment of the missile shield missiles
On its territory, in addition to the conflict between Tehran and Ankara to influence the course of events taking place on Syrian territory.

Security considerations dominated the Turkish stances regarding the Syrian crisis, in light of the growing fears of inflaming the Kurdish problem and the Syrian Kurds' quest to establish an autonomous region similar to the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

**Turkish goals concerning Syria**

1 - Preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria, as well as separating the Kurdish component in Syria from the Kurds in Turkey, and exerting more pressure in the common border area in the governorates of "Al-Hasakah - Deir ez-Zor - Raqqa” [the areas of presence of the Kurds].

2 - Freezing many historical and strategic problems with Syria, especially the “Iskenderun region problem - the issue of water drainage from Turkey to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.”

3 - Reducing the influence/capabilities of the Kurdistan Workers Party [it is classified by Turkey as a terrorist faction] in the regions of northern Syria in anticipation of the escalation of their threats inside Turkey and the impact of this on the internal situation of the Turkish regime.
4 - Changing the human demographics and Syrian identity in the areas of the Turkish/Syrian joint border, and the continuation of the influence of the pro-Turkish organizations in those areas even after the end of the Turkish presence in Syria to ensure their loyalties.

5 - Establishing a safe area inside Syrian territory and along the border strip to secure the return of Syrian refugees in Turkey, whose numbers are estimated at about "3.5" million refugees. (Khalifa 2017) (Tür 2016) (Ozkan 2013) (Tocci 2013)

**Dimensions of Turkish intervention in the Syrian crisis**

**On the political level:**

Formation of a government opposed to the Syrian regime called the “Syrian Interim Government”

In a conference in Istanbul on March 19, 2013 in the city of "Gaziantep" in southern Turkey, headed by the former head of the National Coalition and the Turkmen who is close to Ankara (Abdulrahman Mustafa).

Supporting local councils in cities/villages located in their areas of influence, as they intervened heavily in the cities (Afrin - Tal Abyad - Ras al-Ain) to ensure the formation of local councils loyal to them.

Although the local councils theoretically follow the interim government, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior directly supervises the new councils
without any role for the interim government and with the replication of the Turkish administrative division through the establishment of local councils in major cities and small councils affiliated with them in the surrounding towns and villages, similar to The major and minor municipalities in Turkey Ankara imposed its influence in the local councils by linking each region to the neighboring Turkish province.

There are 10 local councils in the Euphrates Shield area supervised by two states (Gaziantep - Kilis), which are the councils (Al-Bab - Jarablus - Azaz - Al-Rai - Marea - Akhtarin - Suran - Qabasin - Bza'a - Al-Ghandoura) in addition to small sub-councils affiliated to them. In each of these councils, the Turkish authorities appointed a person to act on their behalf and to play the role of a link between the council and the relevant Turkish province, called the “Turkish governor”.

In Afrin, 7 main local councils were formed in the administrative aspects, and the Turkish state of Hatay directly supervises the councils of the Afrin region through the "assistant of the governor" and the number of 6 assistants to him. (Khalifa 2017) (Tür 2016) (Ozkan 2013) (Tocci 2013)

The two local councils of the cities of "Tal Abyad - Ras al-Ain" were established in 2019 after the end of Operation Peace Spring with Turkish support. Both councils are affiliated to the Turkish state of Urfa. The assistant governor for the affairs of the Peace Spring region is called
locally "Wali of Peace Spring" and two Turkish officials are affiliated to him, "Wali" Tal Abyad and the "governor" of Ras al-Ain, both of whom possess security and civil powers similar to the powers granted to wails in the Turkish administrative system.

That the Turkish ministries (education - health - energy - trade - youth and sports - transportation - infrastructure) represent them in the areas of Turkish influence with the aim of coordinating the bodies of the ministries operating in these areas, and the local councils in each area receive their financial budgets monthly from the supervising state. It represents its financial share from the revenues of the crossings after being shared with the Syrian National Army. It is intended to cover the salaries of employees, restore infrastructure and provide municipal services, in the absence of any actual role for the Syrian Interim Government.

The policy of giving loyalty to Turkey over competence contributed to the rise of marginal personalities to the leadership of most of the councils, as well as the exclusion of most qualified people and local actors, in addition to the dominance of political parties on some councils. (Khalifa 2017) (Tocci 2013)

**On the economic front:**

The economies of the areas of Turkish influence in northern Syria depend on the revenues of the border crossings, trade on the one hand, and
agriculture on the other, and since June 2020, the northern Syrian regions have adopted the Turkish lira to reduce the cost of living in light of the continued collapse of the Syrian lira. (COAR 2020)

Turkey’s formation of chambers of industry and commerce in the cities of Azaz, Al-Bab, Afrin and Tal Abyad with the aim of revitalizing the movement of the economy. The commercial movement in the three regions is moving in one direction from Turkey to Syria, with remarkable commercial activity with the regime’s areas in Aleppo and the Syrian Democratic Forces’ areas in Manbij. (COAR 2020)

Turkey’s interest in the agricultural sector in those areas [the area of arable land in the northern countryside of Aleppo is about 100 thousand hectares, of which about 75 thousand hectares are devoted to wheat cultivation and 25 thousand to vegetable cultivation], where it buys the wheat crop from farmers for the benefit of the Turkish Grain Corporation (TMO) Through local intermediaries, the local council in the city of "Tal Abyad" refers to several local projects that will be opened, such as (laboratory, poultry breeding and olive presses), which are supervised by Turkish companies.

**On the military level:**

Turkey’s reliance on a direct military presence in northern Syria to remove Kurdish units from its southern borders, which prompted it to establish a large number of military sites/bases to confront them, while implementing
its strict security policy against the Kurds through the establishment of a civilian police force in those areas. (Khalifa 2017) (Tür 2016) (Ozkan 2013)

The use of armed organizations [integration of all factions loyal to them under the name of “the Syrian National Army” and comprising about “35” thousand elements to implement their goals with their support by Turkish forces [ground forces backed by “tanks - artillery - armored vehicles - Sata - elements” Intelligence] to carry out atypical military operations [city fighting - guerrilla warfare] in conjunction with air sorties / artillery shelling from inside Turkish territory

The military operations carried out by the Turkish forces in northern Syria resulted in the deployment of the Turkish forces at military points inside the Syrian territories, which were represented in the following:

The northern countryside of Aleppo - there are about 21 military points distributed near the main cities and near the lines of contact with each of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the areas of “Manbij and Tal Rifaat and the areas controlled by the Syrian regime in Tadif in addition to the base of Jabal Sheikh Aqil overlooking the city of al-Bab, the largest bases The Turkish army is located in the northern countryside of Aleppo, where it includes a helipad for helicopters.
Afrin region - Turkey controls the headquarters of the People's Protection Units, which are concentrated near the main cities and towns in the region, where it has established (12) military bases, the most prominent of which are in the areas (Bulbul - Rajo - Sheikh Al Hadid - Jindires - Afrin - Barad - Jalbul - Shawargha - Charanli - Kafr Jannah) next to dozens of points on the line of contact with the Syrian Democratic Forces. (Ozkan 2013) (Tocci 2013)

The Turkish forces are deployed in two military points in the city of Ras al-Ain and three in the city of Tal Abyad, in addition to a number of observation points, especially near the international road [M4], and there are two main military bases in the Tal Abyad area, which are Karmazah on the Raqqa-Tal Abyad road (25 km to the south), which is a base that overlooks the points adjacent to the M4 road and is considered the closest to the town of Ain Issa, which is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces, and Bir Ashiq base on the Tal Abyad-Suluk road. (Khalifa 2017)

The areas under Turkey’s control are witnessing the spread of the Turkish army forces in several camps, and the Turkish intelligence takes the headquarters of the civilian police as its headquarters, but the presence of the Turkish army and intelligence is more evident in the regions of Afrin and the northern countryside of Aleppo. The direct Turkish intelligence interventions are very few in the three areas, as Turkey relies on The
Syrian National Army must track down and suppress its opponents, and I instructed it to establish special prisons for this purpose so that it protects itself from direct involvement in crimes of human rights violations. Intelligence relies on investigators from the “Syrian Police and Public Security Forces” who are directly linked to the Turkish security apparatus in Afrin or Ras al-Ain.

**The Repercussions of Turkish Policies on the Future Settlement of the Syrian Crisis**

With regard to the Syrian crisis, since its inception, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in northern and eastern Syria has constituted a Turkish concern, as Ankara saw it as a threat to its national security, and feared that its governance project would incite Turkey’s Kurds to separate, especially due to its alignment with the greater part of the southern border with Turkey and its extension. From the Iraqi border to Afrin, not far from the Mediterranean. The strategic objective of the Turkish policy was summed up in destroying the Kurdish entity by force, and dealing with the resulting security challenge as an absolute priority, without building an integrated policy to meet the needs and secure basic services. During the three military operations launched by the Turkish army in the north of the country, Ankara followed different security and service policies from one region to another according to the relationship with the
Kurdish component to access services to these areas. (Tür 2016) (Tocci 2013)

On the military and administrative level, Turkish policies seemed similar, as they maintained the spread of major camps in the heart of the areas under their influence, while supporting advanced guard points to confront the People’s Protection Units, while the Turkish states were entrusted with the supervision of the neighboring Syrian areas, and imposed on the local councils a model similar to the Turkish model based on the major municipalities and the sub-municipalities attached to them, with the “Turkish governor” considered the supreme authority in the Syrian region that he supervises. (Hinnebusch 2015)

**Turkish goals concerning Libya**

The Turkish regime offered continued support for the Libyan Brotherhood to achieve its interests,

As follows:

1 - The desire to increase its influence on the Libyan arena.

2 - Supporting the religious movement and the Libyan Brotherhood.

3 - Ensuring a major role for Turkish companies in the reconstruction phase in Libya.
4 - Turkey’s endeavor to impose a reality that allows it to play an active role in the eastern Mediterranean to ensure its presence in any future arrangements regarding energy fields in that region in connection with Turkey’s exit from all border demarcation agreements between countries that have common borders in the economic waters of the eastern Mediterranean [Egypt - Cyprus - Greece].

5 - Turkey's possession of papers to pressure Greece in the face of the ongoing coordination between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus regarding the demarcation of the maritime borders.

6 - Turkey's exploitation of the Libyan crisis to try to pass agreements that would allow it to have a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean. (Seufert 2020) (Khalifa 2017) (Demircan 2020)

**Dimensions of Turkish intervention in the Libyan crisis**

**The size of the Turkish military presence in Libya:**

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared a military assistance and cooperation treaty in November 2019, with the government of Libya. Which allowed the deployment of Turkish troops in Libya. Turkey has large assets in Libya, including two full permanent military bases and about 3,000 Syrian mercenaries. On the financial front, Turkey's interest in
Libyan treasuries emerged, especially when it signed in August 2020 a secret agreement with the Central Bank of Libya. From a military point of view, one of the reasons for Turkey's refusal to reduce its military presence in Tripoli is its desire to gain access to lands outside the Libyan borders. Ankara is slowly working to gain passage to the Sahel and the rest of Africa. Due to the importance of the African market. (Seufert 2020)

**The Repercussions of Turkish Policies on the Future Settlement of the Libyan Crisis**

The Libyan crisis was one of the main chronic phenomena in the Middle East, which was characterized by a high degree of conflict and contradiction between its parties on several levels, whether with regard to the nature of issues or the balance of military power between its parties and the nature of the theater of operations in which the conflict is taking place, in addition to the positions of regional and international parties towards this crisis, and the objectives of each party from the use of armed force and the targeted return from it in exchange for the losses it may incur, as these factors led to the complexity and overlapping of the dimensions of the crisis, which led to its inability to settle - especially in light of the escalation of regional and international interventions - where the crisis created chronic security problems. Neighboring countries, foremost of which is Egypt, whose internal stability and national security (represented
by its survival as a unified central state with controlled borders that cannot be crossed) are threatened in one way or another as a result of these divisions and military interventions from several regional parties such as Turkey, whose intervention sparked widespread controversy, especially after authorizing the Turkish Parliament for the government to directly intervene in Libya, so that Turkey becomes a major party and an influential actor in the course of events in Libya. The military militias there are greedy for political and economic gains that do not cover the far and the near, and the developments that we have touched upon in the course of the study. (Demircan 2020) (Seufert 2020) (Khalifa 2017) (Larrabee 2003)

**Conclusion**

So in conclusion, from what the study found out, the Turkish role is a negative factor in resolving the Syrian and Libyan crises and fundamentally prevents any breakthrough or development in the settlement of either crisis. And that Turkey directly aggravates the Syrian and Libyan crises and that it is not in their best interest for Syria or Libya to solve their issues and go back to being functional states. The Turkish role does not contribute in resolving neither the Syrian nor the Libyan crises. In fact, it stalls all advancements in both cases, in order to achieve their selfish goals, in the hopes of reviving the Ottoman Empire under the Neo-Ottoman notion. This is one of the most vital issues
regionally and globally and it poses gargantuan amount of risk to safety and peace in the world.

Turkey’s role in the region is undeniably destructive, they escalate issues to achieve their objectives and gain more power and control in the Middle East, and their policies concerning Syria and Libya specifically are fundamentally set out to exploit the crisis and turmoil going on in the countries, employing crises to become an active and influential party in the future of security arrangements in region.

The only way to combat these crises and to prevent similar ones from occurring in the Middle East is through improving regional affairs between Arab states. And concentrating efforts towards ensuring regional security. While the way to stop it globally, is by the centralized authorities and international players coming together and opening discourse, without truly effective communication the world will never be at peace for long.

**Recommendations**

1- The importance of synergy and concerted efforts of Arab countries in order to develop a strategy aimed at countering the repercussions of Turkish trends and ambitions, and its interference in the affairs of Arab countries, especially Syria and Libya.

2- The necessity of coordination between the active Arab countries in the Syrian and Libyan crises, in order to increase their presence and influence
the course of these crises and to propose solutions that help the two populations liberate their lands from all forms of foreign presence and prevent regional interference, especially Turkish and Iranian, which threatens the stability of the Arab world.

3- The necessity of reviving the joint Arab defense agreement through the League of Arab States in order to find a force/mechanism capable of facing challenges and security threats facing Arab national security, such as the Turkish meddling in Syria and Libya.

4- The need of activating Arab integration agreements and increasing solidarity in various political, economic and military fields between Arab countries in order to reduce any capacity imbalance with Turkey and other regional parties, which is the best way to confront Turkish interference in Arab affairs.

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